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WHAT IS THE APPROPRIATE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
FOR THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY?
David A. Larson*
The implied warranty of habitability requires that residences be
constructed (and in some cases maintained1) in a safe and workmanlike
manner.2 Some jurisdictions do not recognize this warranty under any
circumstances.3 Even among jurisdictions which do recognize the war-
ranty there is disagreement as to its scope. A number of courts hold
* David A. Larson is currently a member of the faculty at Millsaps College, School of Man-
agement. He is a member of the Illinois, Minnesota, and American Bar Associations and prac-
ticed with the Minneapolis, Minnesota law firm of Meagher, Geer, Markham, Anderson, Adam-
son, Flaskamp and Brennan. He is a Phi Beta Kappa graduate of DePauw University and a
graduate of the University of Illinois College of Law.
I. In a significant majority of jurisdictions the implied warranty of habitability has been
recognized in leases of residential real estate as well as in sales of said real estate. At least forty
jurisdictions have recognized the implied warranty as an element of landlord-tenant law. Mallor,
The Implied Warranty of Habitability and the "Non-Merchant" Landlord, 22 DuQ. L. REV. 637,
n. 3 (1984). For instance, it has been held that, "the tenant's obligation to pay rent is dependent
upon the landlord's performance of his obligations, including his warranty to maintain the prem-
ises in habitable condition." Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1082 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
2. The implied warranty of habitability was explained by the North Carolina Supreme Court
in that, "the vendor ... shall be held to impliedly warrant . . . the dwelling, together with all its
fixtures, is sufficiently free from major structural defects, and is constructed in a workmanlike
manner, so as to meet the standard of workmanlike quality then prevailing at the time and place
of construction." Hartley v. Ballou, 286 N.C. 51, 62, 209 S.E.2d 776, 783 (1974).
3. "The law implies no warranties as to the quality or condition of an existing new house in
favor of purchaser by the seller-builder." P.B.R. Enterprises, Inc. v. Perren, 158 Ga. App. 24, 25,
279 S.E.2d 292, 293 (1981).
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that a transfer of property by the first purchaser terminates the implied
warranty of habitability.4 A growing minority of states, however, have
adopted the position that when the original purchaser of a residence
from a builder/vendor transfers that residence to a second purchaser,
the implied warranty of habitability is also transferred to the second
purchaser.5
This article will focus upon those jurisdictions that do allow the
implied warranty of habitability to be transferred to subsequent pur-
chasers. The jurisdictions that have extended the implied warranty of
habitability will first be examined in order to identify the specific theo-
ries that have been asserted in order to allow the extension of protec-
tion. Then efforts to construct or identify appropriate statutes of limita-
tions consistent with these theories will be analyzed. The article will
also briefly examine the question of whether a disclaimer can be used
to prevent an action based upon the implied warranty of habitability.
Several reasons exist for the particular emphasis of this article.
Although it is still the minority one, the position that subsequent pur-
chasers should be protected by the implied warranty of habitability is
clearly gaining strength, and ten jurisdictions to date have adopted this
rule, including seven in the last four years.' Two other jurisdictions
have issued opinions suggesting they may extend the warranty in the
future.7 The decision to extend the implied warranty of habitability is
4. See Cooper & Co., Inc. v. Bryant, 440 So. 2d 1016 (Ala. 1983); San Francisco Real
Estate Investors v. J.A. Jones Const. Co., 703 F.2d 976 (6th Cir. 1983).
5. Richard v. Powercraft Homes, Inc., 139 Ariz. 242, 678 P.2d 427 (1984); Blagg v. Fred
Hunt Co., Inc., 272 Ark. 185, 612 S.W.2d 321 (1981); Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 92 Ill. 2d 171,
441 N.E.2d 324 (1982); Barnes v. MacBrown & Co., Inc., 264 Ind. 227, 342 N.E.2d 619 (1976);
Keyes v. Guy Bailey Homes, Inc., 439 So.2d 670 (Miss. 1983); Hermes v. Staiano, 181 N.J.
Super. 424, 437 A.2d 925 (1981); Elden v. Simmons, 631 P.2d 739 (Okla. 1981); Terlinde v.
Neely, 275 S.C. 395, 271 S.E.2d 768 (1980); Gupta v. Ritter Homes, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 168 (Tex.
1983); Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733 (Wyo. 1979).
6. Richard v. Powercraft Homes, Inc., 139 Ariz. 242, 678 P.2d 427 (1984); Blagg v. Fred
Hunt Co., Inc., 272 Ark. 185, 612 S.W.2d 321 (1981); Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 92 Ill.2d 171,
441 N.E.2d 324 (1982); Keyes v. Guy Bailey Homes, Inc., 439 So.2d 670 (Miss. 1983); Hermes
v. Staiano, 181 N.J. Super. 424, 437 A.2d 925 (1981); Elden v. Simmons, 631 P.2d 739 (Okla.
1981); Gupta v. Ritter Homes, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1983).
7. In a recent case, the North Carolina appellate court stated, "although we need not address
the question as to whether an implied warranty should be extended to subsequent purchasers of
the property, we note that the logic of this holding would apply to such situations." Gaito v.
Auman, 70 N.C. App. 21, 318 S.E.2d 555, 560 n.1 (1984). In Cosmopolitan Homes, Inc. v. Wel-
ler, 663 P.2d 1041 (Colo. 1983), the court stated that while a subsequent purchaser could not sue
under a breach of warranty theory, that purchaser would be able to allege negligence. The Colo-
rado court carefully drew a distinction between actions based upon negligence and actions based
upon breach of an implied warranty. The Cosmopolitan Homes, Inc. court stated that the implied
warranty action is a contract action and that the essential element of privity did not exist when a
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consistent with the Uniform Land Transactions Act.8 The author be-
lieves that the arguments in favor of extending the implied warranty of
habitability are the better reasoned ones and that additional states will
adopt this position. Accordingly, the question of what is the appropriate
statute of limitations will continue to grow in importance.
The problem of determining what should be the statute of limita-
tions when the implied warranty of habitability is extended to subse-
quent purchasers raises issues that also concern states which have
adopted the implied warranty of habitability only for direct purchasers.
Thus, even if a particular state has not extended the implied warranty
of habitability to subsequent purchasers, much of this discussion will be
directly relevant.
THE NATURE OF THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF
HABITABILITY
Historically, a purchaser of a new home which was to be used as a
residence had essentially no protections beyond those existing as cove-
nants in the deed.9 The doctrine of merger was applied in real estate
transactions in such a fashion that even if there were promises con-
tained in the contract for sale, they were not held binding unless they
also appeared in the deed.10 The merger doctrine led to harsh results
for many home buyers. For instance, in Traverse v. Long" the Ohio
Supreme Court addressed the question of whether a dissatisfied plain-
tiff should be allowed recovery for damages arising out of a residential
real estate purchase. The court stated:
Where those (defective) conditions are discoverable and the purchaser
has the opportunity for investigation and determination without con-
cealment or hindrance by the vendor, the purchaser has no just cause
for complaint even though there are misstatements and misrepresenta-
tions by the vendor not so reprehensible in nature as to constitute
fraud."
The Ohio court was merely citing the popular rule of the day, that
subsequent purchaser was involved. 663 P.2d at 1045. Yet that court also cited Terlinde, Moxley,
Elden and Barnes in support of its conclusion as to the negligence theory and perhaps its accept-
ance of those decisions on one theory may lead to future acceptance of the second theory, that of
implied warranty.
8. UNIF. LAND TRANSACTIONS ACT § 2-312, 13 U.L.A. 615 (1977).
9. 7 W. JAEGER, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 926, at 779-80 (3d ed. 1963).
10. Id. at 797.
II. 165 Ohio St. 249, 135 N.E.2d 256 (1956).
12. Id. at 252, 135 N.E.2d at 259.
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of caveat emptor. The recognition of an implied warranty of habitabil-
ity, however, has provided protection for the home purchaser. When a
residence contains deficiencies in workmanship, design, and materials,
recovery has been allowed in order to "afford home buyers protection
from overreaching by comparatively more knowledgeable builder-
vendors." ' s
Courts have experienced significant difficulty in determining the
limits of the implied warranty of habitability. A particularly trouble-
some question has been whether the implied warranty of habitability
should be extended to subsequent purchasers. In attempting to answer
this question courts have become entangled in the problem of whether
an action based upon breach of the implied warranty of habitability
should be characterized as a tort or a contract action.
This characterization has significant consequences. If the implied
warranty of habitability is characterized as a tort, an issue is raised as
to the nature of the damages that can be recovered. There has been a
long standing debate as to whether economic losses should be awarded
in tort actions. The debate can be summarized by reviewing two famil-
iar cases arising in New Jersey and California respectively, Santor v.
A. & M. Kassragheusian, Inc. 4 and Seely v. White Motor Co."3
In Santor the plaintiff was dissatisfied with carpeting which had
been manufactured by the defendant. He sued under an implied war-
ranty theory for the loss in value due to the defects. Recognizing his
right to recovery, the court stated that it would have been an accept-
able alternative for the plaintiff to sue under strict liability in tort.16
The Santor court concluded that it could not determine why a defen-
dant's responsibility should be regarded differently depending upon the
type of damage caused by a defective product.1
On the other hand, in Seely the plaintiff purchased a truck manu-
factured by the defendant. The truck had defective brakes which led to
an accident involving only property damage. Whereas the Supreme
Court of California did allow recovery based upon a warranty theory,
the opinion has been used to support the view that strict liability in tort
should not be available to compensate for the loss suffered when one
receives a defective or inferior product. Rather, contract theory should
13. Duncan v. Schuster-Graham Homes, Inc., 194 Colo. 441, 444, 578 P.2d 637, 638 (1978);
See Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
14. 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
15. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (1965).




be relied upon to satisfy the economic expectations of the parties in
commercial transactions.' 8
A clear problem is presented for any jurisdiction that has adopted
the Seely rule. Typically, a suit for breach of the implied warranty of
habitability is simply a claim that the purchaser did not receive the
type of home that he or she was entitled to receive. In other words, the
claim is a classic one of mere economic loss. If a breach of the implied
warranty of habitability is then defined as a tort cause of action, these
damages cannot be recovered.
Partially as a result of this "economic loss" limitation in tort ac-
tions, courts have tended to identify the implied warranty of habitabil-
ity as a contract action. Once this identification has been made, an-
other problem arises. It was long ago established in cases such as
Winterbottom v. Wright 9 that privity of contract is a necessary re-
quirement in an action to recover damages. Thus, if the implied war-
ranty of habitability is identified as a contract action, how can recovery
be extended to subsequent purchasers who do not have privity with the
original builder/vendor? On the other hand, if the action is determined
to be one in tort, how can the plaintiff recover for mere economic loss?
The matter is further complicated when one comes to the question
that is the focus of this article. Statutes of limitations are frequently
drafted in terms of tort law or contract law. Although a court may
avoid making a tort or contract characterization when determining
whether an implied warranty of habitability exists, it is much more dif-
ficult to avoid having to make a characterization as to which kind of
action is involved when it comes to selecting an appropriate statute of
limitations. Because statutes of limitations tend to be drawn in terms of
either contract or tort causes of action, courts can find themselves mak-
ing one kind of characterization initially, when they first recognize the
existence of an implied warranty of habitability as either a tort or con-
tract cause of action, and then struggling to remain consistent in select-
ing an appropriate statute of limitations.
There does exist a certain class of statutes, however, that some
courts have looked to in order to resolve their dilemma. Many jurisdic-
tions have enacted special statutes of limitations that relate to actions
for damages for injury to person or property or wrongful death caused
by deficiency in design, planning, supervision of construction or con-
18. Seely v. White Motor Co., 45 Cal. Rptr. at 22-23, 403 P.2d at 150-51. See, e.g., Hawkins
Construction Co. v. Matthews Co., Inc., 190 Neb. 546, 561-63, 209 N.W.2d 643, 653 (1973);
Fredonia Broadcasting Corp., Inc. v. RCA Corp., 481 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1973).
19. 10 M. & W. 109, 152 E. & G. Reprint 402 (1842).
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struction of improvements to real property.20 A number of courts. have
turned to this statute of limitations in an effort to settle their concep-
tual problem with the implied warranty of habitability. Yet in so doing
these courts have encountered a completely new set of problems.
DO IMPROVEMENT STATUTES AVOID THE CONTRACT/
TORT DILEMMA?
In the recent case of Daugaard v. Baltic Co-op Building Supply
Association,21 the South Dakota court examined a type of statute
which, at least on its face, appears perfectly suited to be used as a
statute of limitations for the implied warranty of habitability. Com-
monly referred to as improvement statutes, the South Dakota version
provided that:
No action to recover damages for any injury to real or personal prop-
erty, for personal injury or death arising out of any deficiency in the
design, planning, supervision, inspection and observation of construc-
tion, or construction, of an improvement to real property . . . may be
brought against any person performing . . . more than six years after
substantial completion of such construction.22
In an attempt to determine the validity of the statute, the court
directed its attention to South Dakota Constitution Article 6, Section
20.23 This article stated that "courts shall be open, and every man for
an injury done him in his property, person or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law, and right and justice, administered with-
out denial or delay."24 The South Dakota court, citing the United
States Supreme Court in Boddie v. Connecticut,25 asserted that what
the Constitution requires is an opportunity for people to pursue their
rights in a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. The court
then concluded that the statute in question was unconstitutional in that
it was basically a "statute of nullification which stamp(s) out our citi-
zens' causes of action before they accrue. ' 2 6
20. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.5839 (1968); NEV. REV. STAT. § 11.205 (1965)
(amended 1983).
21. 349 N.W.2d 419 (S.D. 1984).
22. Id. at 424 n.2; citing S.D. Codified Laws Ann. 15-2-9.
23. Id. at 424.
24. Id.
25. Id.; Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
26. 349 N.W.2d at 425-26. See also Daugaard v. Baltic Co-op. Bldg. Supply Ass'n, 349
N.W.2d at 425. The Supreme Court of South Dakota notes that similar legislation was held un-
constitutional in'the following cases: Jackson v. Mannesmann Demag Corp., 435 So. 2d 725 (Ala.
1983); Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 N.H. 512, 464 A.2d 288 (1983); Bolick v. American
[Vol. 7:689
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Although these statutes on their face may appear to clearly cover
the implied warranty of habitability, they obviously do not always with-
stand constitutional challenge. Limitation statutes of this nature have
been held unconstitutional based upon theories of equal protection and
lack of due process. 27 There is not, however, agreement as to the un-
constitutionality of these types of statutes. Other jurisdictions have held
such statutes to be constitutional. In Bouser v. City of Lincoln Park28
the Court of Appeals of Michigan examined section 600.5839 of the
Michigan Compiled Laws29 which stated that, "[n]o person may main-
tain any action to recover damages for any injury to property, real or
personal, or for bodily injury or wrongful death . . . more than six
years after the time of occupancy of the completed improvement, use or
acceptance of such improvement." 80 The court confirmed the constitu-
tionality of the statute by developing a distinction between statutes of
abrogation and statutes of limitation. The court asserted that, "it is
well settled that the Legislature of this state has the authority to abol-
ish a cause of action which has not accrued."3 " The clear language of
the statute prohibited any action six years after occupancy or accept-
ance of the improvement. The statute did not concern itself with when
a cause of action might accrue. Accordingly, the plain language of the
enactment led the court to the conclusion that the legislature had sim-
ply intended to abrogate any cause of action arising under the statute
after the six year period had run and that such legislative action was
permissible. 2 Whereas South Dakota would probably characterize such
a statute as one of "nullification" and hold it unconstitutional, Michi-
gan prefers the label "abrogation" and holds such statutes
constitutional.
Even if a court recognizes the constitutionality of one of these im-
provement statutes, additional problems may arise. In Donovan v.
Barmag Corp., 54 N.C. App. 589, 284 S.E.2d 188 (1981), modified and affd, 306 N.C. 364, 293
S.E.2d 415 (1982); Battilla v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 392 So.2d 874 (Fla. 1980); Overland
Constr. Co., Inc. v. Sirmons, 369 So.2d 572 (Fla. 1979); Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky.
1973); Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., 611 P.2d 821 (Wyo. 1980).
27. See, e.g., Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 N.H. 512, 464 A.2d 288 (1983); Bolick v.
American Barmag Corp., 54 N.C. App. 589, 284 S.E.2d 188 (1981); modified and afid, 306
N.C. 364, 293 S.E.2d 415 (1982), respectively.
28. 83 Mich. App. 167, 268 N.W.2d 332 (1978), af'd, 410 Mich. 1, 299 N.W.2d 336
(1980).
29. MicH. CoMP. LAWS § 600.5839 (1968).
30. Id.
31. Bouser v. City of Lincoln Park, 83 Mich. App. at 170, 268 N.W.2d at 333.
32. Id. at 172-73, 268 N.W.2d at 334-35.
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Pruitt,3 the Washington court made an effort to apply a statute simi-
lar to the ones cited above. This statute stated that, "[a]ny cause of
action which has not accrued within six years after such substantial
completion of construction, or within six years of such termination of
services, whichever is later, shall be barred. 3 4
The court explained that this was not truly a statute of limitation.
Rather, it merely provided a time period within which the cause of
action must accrue and it did not establish a limitation period from
accrual to the commencement of the action. The court cited Bouser v.
City of Lincoln Park5 and concluded that this was a "statute of
abrogation." 36
The Washington court determined that because statutes of abroga-
tion can withstand constitutional challenge and are not limitation stat-
utes, a court must then proceed and identify an actual statute of limita-
tions. The court first examined whether the Washington six year
statute of limitations addressing actions "upon a contract in writing, or
liability express or implied arising out of a written agreement," '
should be applied to an action brought by purchasers of a new house
for breach of the warranty of fitness for occupancy. The court rejected
this alternative and stated that this cause of action did not arise out of
a written contract but instead came into existence by virtue of a com-
mon law duty of strict liability that the builder/seller owed to the first
purchaser/occupant.38
The case is important in several respects. Because it refused to
identify the cause of action as one arising in contract, the Washington
court was not bound to a contract statute of limitations. By classifying
the improvement statute as a statute of abrogation, the court avoided a
constitutional challenge. Additionally, the Washington court created
the possibility of extending the implied warranty of habitability to sub-
sequent purchasers. As a result of refusing to identify the action as one
based upon contract theory, the court can avoid a lack of privity prob-
lem whenever it does finally choose to extend the warranty.
Thus, the beginning of a workable approach appears to have been
presented. One can argue that improvement statutes should not be re-
garded as statutes of limitation but rather should be regarded as stat-
33. 36 Wash. App. 324, 674 P.2d 204 (1983).
34. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16.310 (1974).
35. 83 Mich. App. 167, 268 N.W.2d 332 (1978).
36. Donovan v. Pruitt, 36 Wash. App. at 327, 674 P.2d at 206.
37. Id. at 327, 674 P.2d at 206 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16.040(1)).
38. Id. at 328, 674 P.2d at 207.
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utes of abrogation. This latter characterization can assist a court in
avoiding a claim of unconstitutionality.
Yet the Donovan decision does not go far enough. Once an im-
provement statute has been characterized as a statute of abrogation, a
court must then continue its analysis and attempt to identify a statute
of limitations. On the facts before it, the Donovan court did not have to
make such an identification. Because the court refused to apply the six
year contract statute of limitation and because the time period had ex-
pired for all of the remaining statutes of limitations, the plaintiff's ac-
tion was barred under any of the remaining state statutes of limitations
regardless of which statute was selected.
Thus, courts can read improvement statutes as statutes of abroga-
tion and avoid claims that they are favoring special groups by applying
a special statute of limitations. In this way a court can at least narrow
its choice of statutes of limitations. It can now avoid the problem of
choosing whether an improvement statute on the one hand, or a tort or
contract statute of limitations on the other, should be the appropriate
statute of limitations. The choice is narrowed to the contract or tort
statute of limitations. Unfortunately, however, this is merely back to
square one. The court is once again left with the contract or tort
choice.
WILL A MORE DETAILED IMPROVEMENT STATUTE SOLVE
THE PROBLEM?
A number of improvement statutes give hope that the contract/
tort choice can be avoided because they include separate statutes of
limitations within their text. For instance, the improvement statute in
Colorado states that, "[a]ll actions against any architect, contractor,
engineer, or inspector brought to recover damages for injury to per-
son(s) .. .shall be brought within two years after the claim for relief
arises . ..but in no case shall such an action be brought more than
ten years after the substantial completion. . ... " This statute would
appear to resolve any problems in that it seems to be both a statute of
abrogation and a statute of limitations.
But leaving aside for a moment the fact that by drafting such a
statute one may have raised equal protection or due process claims by
including a special (and usually shorter) limitation period within a stat-
ute of abrogation, the case of Duncan v. Schuster-Graham Homes,
39. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-127 (1973).
1984]
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Inc.40 illustrates how reluctant a court may be to apply such statutes.
In Schuster an action was brought alleging breach of an implied war-
ranty of habitability. The court examined whether the Colorado im-
provement statute should be applied. The plaintiffs were merely claim-
ing damages relating to deficiencies in the house itself. They sought the
cost of repairing the deficiencies or the difference between the value of
the house they actually received and the value of the house they would
have had if it had been as warranted. 4'
The court observed that the plaintiffs apparently did not seek dam-
ages for injuries to person or property caused by those deficiencies.
Consequently, the case should be regarded as an action arising from a
contract of sale. Declaring that warranties are contractual in nature,
the court refused to apply the improvement statute and instead turned
to the general six year statute of limitations for contract actions. 2
The Colorado court expressed obvious concern for the fact that
under the improvement statute the plaintiffs would be restricted to a
two year effective statute of limitations contained within a ten year
statute of accrual. In an effort to avoid such a short statute of limita-
tions, the Colorado court asserted that the improvement statute could
not apply because it was clear from its language that the statute was
not meant to apply to simple actions seeking damages for structural
deficiencies. The court declared that by using traditional tort terminol-
ogy "injury to person or property" the Colorado legislature must have
intended to exclude situations such as the Donovan case.4 3
The Colorado court's efforts to simply avoid this two year statute
of limitations are painfully obvious. While suspect in principle, this rea-
soning does not cause a particular problem in Colorado at the present
time because Colorado has not yet extended the implied warranty of
habitability to subsequent purchasers.44 Colorado has thus not had to
resolve the lack of privity problem which results from the characteriza-
tion of the implied warranty of habitability as a contract action. If Col-
orado does decide to extend the warranty, however, the lack of privity
between the builder/vendor and the subsequent purchaser must be
addressed.
If a court categorizes the implied warranty of habitability as a
40. 194 Colo. 441, 578 P.2d 637 (1978).
41. Id. at 447, 578 P.2d at 641.
42. Id. at 446, 578 P.2d at 641.
43. Id. at 445, 578 P.2d at 640.
44. See, Cosmopolitan Homes, Inc. v. Weller, 663 P.2d 1041, 1043 (Colo. 1983) wherein the
court repeated that, "[w]e have limited the class of purchasers entitled to the contractual protec-
tion of the implied warranty to first purchasers."
[Vol. 7:689
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contract action it should, in order to remain consistent with contract
principles, rule as the Missouri court did in Clark v. Landelco.45 The
Missouri court held that when second purchasers are not in privity of
contract with the original vendor they will be barred from bringing suit
based upon a theory of implied warranty of habitability."'
While perhaps sound in principle, this conclusion leaves a subse-
quent purchaser in a helpless position. In Clark the court stated that
there is no cause of action for damages due to deterioration or loss of
bargain resulting from a builder's alleged carelessness or negligence in
the construction of a residence if one is only pursuing a tort claim.47 In
other words, there cannot be any economic loss recovery in a tort
action.
A subsequent purchaser in Missouri has been stripped of any
chance of recovery. According to the Missouri court, an action for
breach of the implied warranty of habitability is a contract action. It
will thus not be available to subsequent purchasers because there is no
privity of contract.' 8 Yet when turning to possible tort theories, one is
faced with the proposition that a purchaser is not entitled to recovery in
tort for mere deterioration or deficient workmanship. Consequently, a
subsequent purchaser will have no relief of any nature.
In spite of the need for principled judicial reasoning, other juris-
dictions have looked at improvement statutes and attempted to avoid
rather harsh rules stating that a plaintiff has only as few as two years
from the date when he or she discovered or should have discovered the
defect in which to initiate a lawsuit. The development of a line of cases
in Minnesota illustrates the aversion of some courts to improvement
statutes. In Kittson County v. Wells, Denbrook & Assocs. Inc.,'9 the
county brought an action to recover against an architect and construc-
tion contractor alleging breach of warranty and negligence in the de-
sign and installation of a new finish on the courthouse. The court ex-
amined the assertion that Minnesota Statute section 541.05(1)50 should
apply. The statute declared that:
No action to recover damages for any injury to property, real or per-
sonal, or for bodily injury or wrongful death, arising out of the defec-
tive and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property
45. 657 S.W.2d 634 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
46. Id. at 636 (citing Crowder v. Vandendeale, 564 S.W.2d 879 (Mo. 1978)).
47. 657 S.W.2d at 635.
48. Id. at 636.
49. 308 Minn. 237, 241 N.W.2d 799 (1976).
50. MINN. STAT. § 541.05(1) (1965).
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shall be brought against any person . ..more than two years after
discovery thereof, nor, in any event more than ten years after the
completion of said construction.51
The Supreme Court of Minnesota determined that this statute did
not apply in the instant case. The court reasoned that although the
statute did not use the term "tort," it did contain several references
which strongly suggested the legislature intended the statute to apply
only to tort actions. First, the statute referred several times to injuries
to person or property. 52 Second, the statute required that said injury
arise out of the "defective and unsafe" condition of the improvement.53
Third, the statute referred to defective and unsafe conditions "consti-
tuting the proximate cause of the injury."54 Thus, the court concluded,
the statute was clearly borrowing from tort law and not from contract
or warranty law.55
The Kittson court referred to the Catholic University Law Re-
view5" for authority that over 30 jurisdictions had recently enacted stat-
utes of this nature. 57 The court decided that the Minnesota statute was
part of a trend to protect architects and builders from the large product
liability judgments of the 1960's and consequently the statute should be
limited to tort actions. If the Minnesota Legislature had intended the
Minnesota statute to cover actions sounding in contract or in warranty
it would have included broader language. Thus, the appropriate statute
was not the improvement statute but rather the general six year statute
of limitations.58
This aversion to improvement statutes was further evidenced in
Caledonia Community Hospital v. Liebenberg Smiley.59 There the
court spelled out more clearly that Minnesota Statutes section 541.05
did not apply to either contract or tort claims by an owner against
those persons who contracted with the owner for the design and con-
struction of an improvement to real estate."0 The Caledonia court actu-
51. Id. at subd. 1.
52. Kittson County v. Wells, Denbrook & Assocs., Inc., 308 Minn. 237, 241, 241 N.W.2d
799, 801.
53. Id., 241 N.W.2d at 801.
54. Id. at 241, 241 N.W.2d at 801-02.
55. Id. at 241, 241 N.W.2d at 802.
56. Comment, Limitation of Action Statutes for Architects and Builders-Blueprints for
Non-Action, 18 CATH. U.L. REV. 361 (1969).
57. Kittson County v. Wells, Denbrook & Assocs., Inc., 308 Minn. at 241-242, 241 N.W.2d
at 802.
58. Id. at 243, 241 N.W.2d at 802.
59. 308 Minn. 255, 248 N.W.2d 279 (1976).
60. Id. at 258, 248 N.W.2d at 280.
[Vol. 7:689
WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY
ally went beyond what was established in the Kittson County case. Al-
though the Caledonia case cites Kittson County for the proposition that
section 541.05(1) should not apply to tort claims,61 the Kittson County
court actually stated only that Minnesota Statutes 541.05(1) does not
apply to actions sounding in breach of contract and warranty.62
What the Minnesota court did in Caledonia bordered on the ab-
surd. Whereas it is questionable whether an improvement statute
should be limited to just tort actions, at least there is some basis for
such a limitation. In Caledonia the Minnesota Supreme Court simply
ignored the Minnesota improvement statute altogether. The court re-
fused to apply it even to a cause of action sounding in tort. The effort
to avoid applying improvement statutes containing short statutes of
limitations had reached its most extreme level.
Perhaps fortunately, the following year the Minnesota Supreme
Court addressed the question of whether or not the statute could with-
stand a constitutional challenge. In Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Thomp-
son-Yeager, Inc.,6" the court found the statute unconstitutional because
it granted "immunity from suit to a certain class of defendants, without
there being a reasonable basis for that classification." 4 The statute
placed absolute time limitations upon damage claims against certain
persons who constructed or designed improvements to real estate but
excluded other persons against whom third parties might bring claims
should they incur injury.6
Thus, the final step in Minnesota's treatment of the improvement
statute was to declare the statute unconstitutional. Recognizing that
the rejection of the improvement statute left a void that needed to be
filled, the Minnesota Legislature enacted statute section 327A.0216
which states that in every sale of a completed dwelling the vendor shall
warrant to the vendee that during a one year period from and after the
warranty date the dwelling shall be free from defects caused by non-
compliance with building standards; during a two year period the
dwelling shall be free from defects caused by faulty installation of
plumbing, electrical, heating, and cooling systems; and during the ten
year period from and after the warranty, the dwelling shall be free
61. Id., 248 N.W.2d at 280.
62. Kittson County v. Wells, Denbrook & Assocs., Inc., 308 Minn. at 243, 241 N.W.2d at
802.
63. 260 N.W.2d 548 (Minn. 1977).
64. 260 N.W.2d at 555.
65. Id.
66. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 327A.02 (1977) (amended 1982).
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from major construction defects.6 7 Minnesota has drafted what appears
to be merely a statute of abrogation. Assuming this is the case, there
remains uncertainty as to what is the appropriate statute of limitations.
Oregon avoided its improvement statute in a manner similar to
that pursued by Minnesota. Although not reaching the point of declar-
ing its statute unconstitutional, the Oregon Court of Appeals in Bever-
idge v. King68 considered applying the state's improvement statute,
which stated that an action to recover damages had to be commenced
within two years from the date of injury as well as within ten years
from substantial completion of the construction. 9 The Beveridge court,
however, asserted that the action was one for breach of contract for the
sale of improved real property and that it was instead governed by the
Oregon statute for contract actions, which established a longer, six year
period of limitations.7
The Oregon court relied upon Securities Intermountain, Inc. v.
Sunset Fuel Co. 71 The Securities Intermountain court had concluded
that the improvement statute did not apply to a claim of financial loss
arising from breach of contract and had stated that the language "inju-
ries to . . . a person or to property" was meant to encompass "personal
injuries" but not financial losses such as a reduced value of the com-
pleted project due to unsatisfactory performance of the work.7 2 How-
ever, the Securities Intermountain court had distinguished its case
from a case in which a warranty of "workmanlike" performance and
due care was pleaded as an implied term.73 The court in Beveridge was
addressing a claim that there had been a breach of an implied term of
the agreement, yet the court still refused to apply the improvement
statute to the implied warranty cause of action.
WHAT HAPPENS WHEN THE WARRANTY IS EXTENDED
TO SUBSEQUENT PURCHASERS?
In spite of the privity problems, courts have continued to identify
the implied warranty of habitability as a contract right even when ex-
tending the warranty to subsequent purchasers. In the recent Texas
67. Id.
68. 50 Or. App. 585, 623 P.2d 1132 (1981).
69. Id. at 587, 623 P.2d at 1133. The Oregon court sets Out OR. REV. STAT. § 12.135(1) in
n.l.
70. Beveridge v. King, 50 Or. App. at 589, 623 P.2d at 1134.
71. 289 Or. 243, 611 P.2d 1158 (1980).
72. Id. at 251, 611 P.2d at 1162.
73. Id. at 263, 611 P.2d at 1169.
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case of Gupta v. Ritter Homes, Inc. 4 the court concluded that an im-
plied warranty of habitability and good workmanship is implicit in a
contract between a builder/vendor and an original purchaser and is au-
tomatically assigned to a subsequent purchaser.7 5 The court stated that,
"this interpretation of an implied warranty as a contract remedy is con-
sistent with our holding in Humber and our recent holding in G. W.L. v.
Robichaux where we discussed the implied warranty of habitability ex-
plicitly in terms of contract law."6
The conflict as to which theory to use, tort or contract, led the
Indiana court in Barnes v. Mac Brown & Company, Inc.7 to assert
that the logic which compelled the rejection of privity of contract in
products liability law compels the same type of change in the area of
real property. The court stated that the traditional requirement of priv-
ity between a builder/vendor and a purchaser was an outmoded one. 78
The contention that there should be a distinction between economic loss
and personal injury damages was found to be without merit. This con-
clusion permitted the court to extend the implied warranty of habitabil-
ity to a subsequent purchaser and additionally allowed the court to per-
mit recovery for economic loss.
The Indiana court, however, did not adequately explain how it
could avoid the traditional contractual requirement of privity and
stopped short of identifying this as either a cause of action in strict
liability in tort or another type of tort cause of action. The dissent in
Barnes responded to this lack of analysis and claimed that because this
was not a tort case the extension should not be allowed. Rather, the
case was properly governed by the law of contracts and sales and not
the law of torts.79
IF IT IS A CONTRACT, IS IT AN ORAL OR WRITTEN
CONTRA CT?
If a court does determine that a breach of an implied warranty of
habitability results in a contract action but that lack of privity is of no
concern when extending the warranty to subsequent purchasers, that
court must still answer additional questions. If an action for breach of
an implied warranty is considered a contract action, the decision has to
74. 646 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1983).
75. Id. at 169.
76. Id.
77. 264 Ind. 227, 342 N.E.2d 619 (1976).
78. Id. at 229, 342 N.E.2d at 620.
79. Id. at 231, 342 N.E.2d at 621.
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be made whether this action arises out of a written contract. For exam-
ple, in Texas a court was confronted with two different statutes of limi-
tations that might apply depending upon whether an implied warranty
action arose out of a written contract or whether it arose out of an oral
contract.8 0
In Certain-Teed Products Corp. v. Bell,81 the Texas court focused
upon an implied warranty arising out of a contract to build a house.
The contract to build a house was in writing. Thus, the court stated,
the suit was not based upon a failure to do something the petitioner
had orally promised to do but rather upon a failure to do in a good and
workmanlike manner that which the petitioner had agreed in writing to
do. 2 The court concluded that a warranty which the law implies from
the existence of a written contract is as much a part of the writing as
any express terms of the contract. Any action to enforce such a war-
ranty would be governed by the statute pertaining to written
contracts.83
Not all courts agree with Texas, however. The Missouri Court of
Appeals was faced with a similar question in Ruhling v. Robert Dawes
Construction Co. 4 In Ruhling, the plaintiffs filed suit to recover for
defects in workmanship in the construction of a residence. The court
observed that the plaintiffs' action was for breach of an implied war-
ranty of fitness of the property for use as a residence.85 An inspection
of the exhibits indicated that there was no express warranty involved.
The Missouri court rejected a claim that the proper statute of limita-
tions was section 516.110 of the Missouri Statutes," which stated that
a ten year statute of limitations shall apply to any "action upon any
writing, whether sealed or unsealed .... ,"87 Instead the court applied a
five year statute of limitations which covered "all actions upon con-
tracts, obligations, or liabilities, express or implied, except those men-
tioned in section 516.110 .. ."88
The Oklahoma court in Elden v. Simmons,s9 where the court ex-
tended the implied warranty of habitability to a subsequent purchaser,
80. TEx. STAT. ANN. arts. 5526, 5527 (Vernon 1958).
81. 422 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. 1968).
82. Id. at 720.
83. Id. at 721.
84. 610 S.W.2d 403 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
85. Id. at 405.
86. Mo. REV. STAT. § 516.110 (1969).
87. Id.
88. Mo. REV. STAT. § 516.120 (1969).
89. 631 P.2d 739 (Okla. 1981).
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agreed with the Texas court and identified a breach of this warranty as
a suit upon a written contract.90 The court stated that this action fell
clearly within the first section of title 12, section 95 of the Oklahoma
Statutes,91 which provided that, "actions upon any contract or agree-
ment or promise in writing may be maintained within five years after
the cause of action shall have accrued."92 The court stated that the
requirement of privity as a prerequisite to suit on an implied or express
warranty was an antiquated notion and alluded to a case decided under
the Uniform Commercial Code for the position that privity was not
necessary to a suit in warranty. 93
The Illinois appellate court in Cooper v. United Development Co.94
held that an action on this type of implied undertaking constitutes an
action on an unwritten contract and must be brought within the appli-
cable Illinois five year limitation period.95 The Cooper case involved
condominium owners bringing an action against a developer, contrac-
tor, subcontractor and beneficial owner for breach of the implied war-
ranty of habitability.
Inconsistencies exist even within the same state. In another Illinois
case, Schoenrock v. Anden Corp.,96 homeowners filed a complaint
against the builder alleging a defect in the sewer pipe construction. The
defendant had constructed and sold the house in 1977 and the plaintiffs
filed their small claims complaint in February of 1983.
The defendant asserted that the plaintiffs should be barred from
obtaining relief because the implied warranty of habitability did not
extend liability to a builder for defects which did not manifest them-
selves until two to six years after the sale.97 Plaintiffs testified that they
never reported the problem because two plumbers had diagnosed the
possible cause of the problem as a mere buildup of debris in the pipes.
The defendant argued that builder/vendors do not guarantee a
home for its lifetime and that a claim manifesting itself so late should
not be encompassed within the implied warranty of habitability. The
defendant cited Redarowicz v. Ohlendor/98 in support of the position
that the implied warranty of habitability extended to a subsequent pur-
90. Id. at 742 n.l.
91. OKLA. STAT. Tit. 12 § 95 (1971).
92. Elden v. Simmons, 631 P.2d at 742.
93. Id.
94. 122 111. App. 3d 850, 462 N.E.2d 629 (1 Dist. 1984).
95. Id. at 858-59, 462 N.E.2d at 635.
96. 125 Ill. App. 3d 118, 465 N.E.2d 146 (2 Dist. 1984).
97. 465 N.E.2d at 147.
98. 92 Ill. 2d 171, 441 N.E.2d 324 (1982).
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chaser but was limited to latent defects which manifested themselves
within a reasonable time after the original purchase of the home.99
The Schoenrock court was thus requested to select the applicable
statute of limitations. Section 13-214(a) of the Illinois Revised Stat-
utes"°° provided that "[a]ctions based upon tort, contract, or otherwise
against any person for an act or omission of such person in the design,
planning, supervision, observation or management of construction . . .
shall be commenced within 2 years from the time the person bringing
an action . . . knew or should reasonably have known. . ". ."'0' The
Schoenrock court concluded that this section applies in actions seeking
recovery under the implied warranty of habitability theory for defective
construction of a home. The court also cited Paragraph 13-214(b),102 to
the effect that, "no action based upon tort, contract or otherwise may
be brought against any person for an act or omission of such person in
the design, planning, supervision, observation or management of con-
struction, or construction of an improvement to real property after 12
years have elapsed from the time of such act or omission."103
The Illinois Appellate Court for the Second District in Schoenrock
determined that the Illinois improvement statute was the appropriate
statute. The statute should be read so as to provide a twelve year ac-
crual period with a two year statute of limitations from the point the
plaintiff knew or should have known of the wrongful act or omission.
Yet the First District in Cooper had applied the five year statute of
limitations for unwritten contracts.
The inconsistency within Illinois, unlike the inconsistencies be-
tween states, can be explained. Although exact dates of execution and
completion of the condominiums involved in Cooper are not clear from
the appellate opinion, it is clear that the completion was more than five
years before 1982 because the case was dismissed. The improvement
statute in Illinois10' did not take effect until November 29, 1979.105
Because the cause of action arose in Cooper before November 29,
1979, the court did not apply the improvement statute and instead
turned to the five year statute of limitations.
99. Schoenrock v. Anden Corp., 465 N.E.2d at 148.
100. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10, § 13-214(a) (1981).
101. Id.
102. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 13-214(b) (1981).
103. Id.
104. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 13-214 (1981).
105. Id.; See Briarcliffe West v. Wiseman Construction Co., 118 II1. App. 3d 163, 172, 454
N.E.2d 363, 368 (2 Dist. 1983).
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WHEN DOES THE LIMITATION PERIOD BEGIN TO RUN?
Confusion not only exists as to which statute should be selected as
the appropriate statute of limitations, but also as to when the limitation
period begins to run. In the Missouri case of Lato v. Concord Homes,
Inc. 0 the original purchasers/plaintiffs asserted that their cause of ac-
tion did not accrue until they were able to discover the defect. The
Missouri court, however, rejected the discovery test and instead reaf-
firmed its position that the "capable of ascertainment" test should be
used for determining when the period of limitations begins to run.10 7
The court stated that plaintiffs' allegations of implied warranty, "ac-
crued when they first became aware that damage was occurring, a date
alleged to be 'several months after moving into their new home' on
March 28, 1968."108 The Missouri appellate court then applied a five
year period of limitation rather than a ten year period of limitation.
Missouri, if one recalls, did not apply its ten year period because that is
applicable only to actions upon a writing. Missouri is one of the states
holding that this cause of action is not upon a writing.' 09
If anything is consistent in this area of the law it is the fact that
when one moves between jurisdictions the law consistently changes.
The method of determining when a cause of action for breach of an
implied warranty of habitability accrues supports this rule of
inconsistency.
The Supreme Court of Alabama in Stephens v. Creel'" adopted a
different position than Missouri. It determined that a cause of action
based upon the implied warranty accrues and the statute of limitations
begins to run on the date of completion of the performance. The court
stated that it is the failure to construct the house in a workmanlike
manner that constitutes the breach."' The Alabama court reaffirmed
the rule set out in Sims v. Lewis' 2 that under no circumstances would
the time limitations within which to file suit for implied warranty ex-
tend beyond the period allowed for filing suit on an express warranty
(six years). 1 13
The dissent in Stephens argued that the majority had selected an
106. 659 S.W.2d 593 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
107. Id. at 594-95.
108. Id. at 595.
109. See supra notes 45-47.
110. 429 So.2d 278 (Ala. 1983).
Ill. Id. at 280.
112. 374 So.2d 298 (Ala. 1979).
113. Stephens v. Creel, 429 So.2d at 281 (citing Sims v. Lewis, 374 So.2d at 305).
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inappropriate rule for the beginning date of the running of the statute
of limitations. It stated that the majority opinion assumed that the
breach of the contract and the accrual of the cause of action occurred
simultaneously. 1 4 The date of the breach, however, is not necessarily
the accrual date of the action. The key is not the breach but rather the
actionable breach. The dissent cited West Pratt Coal Co. v. Dorman"'
for the proposition that it is the actionable breach that accrues the
cause of action.' 6
The dissent observed that according to the majority it was the fail-
ure to construct the house in a workmanlike manner that constitutes
the breach. The dissent objected and stated that one must focus upon
the question as to when the breach became actionable." 7 One must ask
what would happen if the homeowners filed suit the day following the
completion of their house for breach of warranty. Any alleged damages
would be purely speculative at that point. Consequently, no breach
could be shown because the cause of action simply had not yet
accrued.118
The logic of the dissent is difficult to escape. It appears as though
a purchaser in Alabama would be well advised to initiate suit on the
day the house is completed. Of course, that purchaser will have little
chance of success in most cases because there are no discoverable dam-
ages. It is unfair to assert that a limitation period begins to run at a
time when a plaintiff/purchaser will have absolutely no chance of suc-
cess when bringing an action.
The Stephens opinion relies heavily upon Sims, cited above. In the
Sims case the Alabama court stated that the length of the statute of
limitations should be a reasonable period. " 9 It was the Sims court that
announced that an implied warranty should be recognized in the sale of
homes. Sims established a confusing standard, however. On the one
hand, Sims suggested that the implied warranty of habitability should
cover a reasonable period of time. On the other hand, the court stated
that the jury must answer the question whether a defect was discovera-
ble within a "reasonable" period.12 0
The Alabama court is thus confusing the problem of determining
the date of accrual and the problem of determining the length of the
114. Stephens v. Creel, 429 So.2d at 285.
115. 161 Ala. 389, 49 So. 849 (1909).
116. Stephens v. Creel, 429 So.2d at 285.
117. Id. at 284.
118. Id. at 286.




period of limitation. Sims declared that in no event would a plaintiff be
allowed to file suit for implied warranty beyond a six year period.' 2 '
Yet it is not clear from what point in time the six years begin to run. It
is possible to argue that the period begins to run after a reasonable
period has passed within which the defect should have been discovered.
One can also argue that the Sims court declared that a plaintiff will
have no more than six years to sue from the date of completion and
that if it would be reasonable to bring an action in less than six years
the plaintiff must do so. In Stephens, the Alabama court at least clari-
fied the date from which the statute of limitations begins to run; that
being, the date of completion. 22 The problem, however, is that the stat-
ute may begin to run before there is anything for the plaintiff to
discover.
While it may not resolve the uncertainty, it is of interest to ex-
amine the manner in which other jurisdictions are settling the question
as to when the limitations period begins to run. The Illinois court in
Schoenrock v. Anden Corp.2 3 reviewed the case under the Illinois im-
provement statute,2 4 which became effective in November of 1979.125
The court stated that under the improvement statute a plaintiff will
have two years to bring suit from the time the plaintiff knew or should
reasonably have known of the problem.' 26 The Illinois improvement
statute, if one recalls, sets out that such an action may not be brought
when more than twelve years have elapsed from the time of the act or
omission. 2 7
Several courts that have extended the implied warranty of habita-
bility to subsequent purchasers have adopted "reasonable" limitation
periods. In Terlinde v. Neely, 2 8 however, the South Carolina court did
not begin to discuss the problems that arise in determining an appropri-
ate limitation period for the implied warranty of habitability. The court
stated that the length of "[t]ime for latent defects to surface . . .
should be controlled by the standard of reasonableness and not an arbi-
trary time limit created by the Court."'2 9
Thus, it is unclear whether the court was saying that the cause of
121. Id.
122. Stephens v. Creel, 429 So.2d at 280.
123. 125 Ill. App. 3d 118, 465 N.E.2d 146 (2 Dist. 1984).
124. See supra note 104.
125. Id.
126. Schoenrock v. Anden Corp., 465 N.E.2d at 150.
127. See supra note 102.
128. 275 S.C. 395, 271 S.E.2d 768 (1980).
129. 271 S.E.2d at 769.
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action has to accrue within a reasonable time period. If that is the case
the court must still select a limitation statute. One does not know
whether the court is saying that the cause of action expires after a
reasonable time has passed within which the plaintiff has or should
have discovered a defect, or whether the court is saying that the limita-
tion period itself is a reasonable period and that it begins to run from
the date of transfer or completion. A simple statement that the implied
warranty of habitability lasts a reasonable time does not begin to pro-
vide adequate information for purchasers and builder/vendors attempt-
ing to distribute loss and negotiate price.
In Blagg v. Fred Hunt Co., Inc.,' the Arkansas court also held
that a builder/vendor's implied warranty of fitness for habitation ex-
tends to subsequent purchasers for a reasonable length of time."'1 Yet
it is not clear whether this means that the subsequent purchaser will
have a "new" reasonable length of time to discover the defect in addi-
tion to the reasonable period of time the original purchaser had. One
does not know whether one should combine the amounts of time to
equal only one reasonable period of time. If an improvement statute is
available and applied such that an original purchaser may have an ac-
crual period allowing up to twelve years from the time of completion to
initiate a lawsuit, is the subsequent purchaser to be left with far less
time? A limitation period that is "reasonable" simply leaves too many
questions for a subsequent purchaser.
The Wyoming court in Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc.1 32 also
extended the implied warranty of habitability to subsequent purchasers
while stating that it would exist for a reasonable period of time. 3 3 And
once again one is left with a situation in which one does not really have
any accurate idea as to what the statute of limitations is for subsequent
purchasers. This criticism has nothing to do with the fact that the pe-
riod of "reasonableness" implies some uncertainty. Rather it addresses
the uncertainty remaining as to questions such as those set out in the
preceding paragraph. Those are questions which could and should be
answered. Stating that the implied warranty of habitability will con-
tinue for a reasonable period of time gives very little guidance and cre-
ates a situation that will result in serious discrepancies between
jurisdictions.
130. 272 Ark. 185, 612 S.W.2d 321 (1981).
131. Id. at 187, 612 S.W.2d at 322.
132. 600 P.2d 733 (Wyo. 1979).




A very abrupt way to terminate an implied warranty of habitabil-
ity is to enforce a disclaimer. Although not directly related to the issue
of limitation periods, disclaimers can deprive a subsequent purchaser of
a cause of action just as effectively as can an elapsed limitation period
and thus disclaimers deserve at least brief mention. Consider the situa-
tion where a builder/vendor disclaims a warranty of habitability and
thus accepts a lower price in exchange for not having to worry about
the condition of the home in the future. Should a subsequent purchaser
be permitted to initiate suit against the builder/vendor even though the
builder/vendor did not receive consideration for the granting of this
protection? On the other hand, should an unassuming subsequent pur-
chaser be prejudiced as a result of the waiver of warranty rights by the
original purchaser?
The question of whether there can be disclaimers even for original
purchasers has not yet been resolved as case law can be found support-
ing both sides of the issue. For instance, in G. W.L. Inc. v.
Robichaux,"3 the Texas court stated that language waiving the im-
plied warranty of habitability must be clear and free from doubt.135
Implicit in this statement is the recognition that the warranty can be
disclaimed.
Yet even if a disclaimer was clear and free from doubt, it might
not be brought to a subsequent purchaser's attention. If disclaimers are
allowed and recognized against subsequent purchasers, the disclaimer
should be required to be recorded in the same manner as encumbrances
on the property are recorded. Only in this manner can one guarantee
that the disclaimer or waiver will be brought to the attention of the
subsequent purchaser.
Several courts have required not only that the waiver be express
but also that the waiver be brought to the attention of the purchaser
and that the purchaser understand the significance of the waiver. 3 ' In
a subsequent purchaser situation it is unlikely that the first purchaser/
seller will have similar concerns about the waiver. Because the first
purchaser/seller is not a potential target under the implied warranty of
habitability as it has generally been defined,137 the first purchaser/
134. 643 S.W.2d 392 (Tex. 1982).
135. Id. at 393.
136. See, e.g., Schoeneweis v. Herrin, 110 III. App. 3d 800, 806, 443 N.E.2d 36, 41 (1982);
Crowder v. Vandendeale, 564 S.W.2d 879, 881 n.4 (Mo. 1978).
137. See, e.g., Columbia Western Corp. v. Vela, 122 Ariz. 28, 592 P.2d 1294 (1979); Sloat v.
Matheny, 625 P.2d 1031 (Colo. 1981); Vetor v. Shockley, 414 N.E.2d 575 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980);
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seller has no reason to be concerned whether a disclaimer is regarded
as effective. In fact, the first purchaser/seller may very well try to
avoid bringing the disclaimer to the attention of subsequent purchasers.
The disclaimer may raise a question in the buyer's mind and conse-
quently lower the price of the house.
When first purchasers/sellers realize they are not subject to suit
under the implied warranty of habitability, they have no reason to care
whether or not an effective disclaimer was created. It would be naive to
expect a first purchaser/seller to take the initiative and explain a dis-
claimer. It is not in his or her self-interest to do so and furthermore,
even if one was so inclined he or she may not have the information and
sophistication to adequately explain the disclaimer. Some courts have
hesitated to enforce disclaimers against original purchasers and a con-
cern has been the presumption that this first purchaser did not have the
sophistication to understand the disclaimer.138 To say that the first pur-
chaser has an obligation to explain the nature of the disclaimer to a
subsequent purchaser might assume more knowledge than the first pur-
chaser possesses.
At least one court has suggested that it might enforce the dis-
claimer against a subsequent purchaser. The Oklahoma Court of Ap-
peals in Bridges v. Ferrell139 focused upon a situation in which a defen-
dant built a single family residence and sold it to a private party who
then subsequently resold the house. The real estate purchase contract
for the resale of the home to the plaintiffs provided that the "builders'
warranty [is] to be transferred to buyer." 4" However, the original con-
tract for sale stated that the seller was provided only a one year war-
ranty period. The court stated that the mere existence of an express
warranty providing for specified protection for a limited period of time
does not displace the obligation arising under the implied warranty of
habitability."' Rather, if one is going to relieve a builder/vendor from
his obligation under an implied warranty of habitability there must be
clear and conspicuous language evidencing the builder/vendor's dis-
claimer of its obligations. The court was thus suggesting that if the
disclaimer had been properly drafted, it could have been asserted
Sousa v. Albino, 120 R.I. 461, 388 A.2d 804 (1978); Cohen v. Blessing, 259 S.C. 400, 192 S.E.2d
204 (1972). For a discussion that includes arguments to the contrary, see Haskell, The Case for
an Implied Warranty of Quality in Sales of Real Property, 53 GEo. L. R. 633, 650-52 (1965).
138. See, e.g., Schoeneweis v. Herrin, 110 111. App. 3d 800, 443 N.E.2d 36 (1982); Colsant v.
Goldschmidt, 97 III. App. 3d 53, 421 N.E.2d 1073 (1981).
139. 685 P.2d 409 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984).




against the subsequent purchaser. The Oklahoma court stated that it
was in agreement with the majority of courts holding that a knowing
disclaimer of the implied warranty will not be considered against public
policy. 1 2 The problem with this position, however, is that it will be
difficult to establish a knowing waiver on behalf of the subsequent
purchaser.
If one is reluctant to recognize even a clear and conspicuous dis-
claimer, that reluctance will most certainly grow when one considers
the validity of an "as is" disclaimer. There has been limited discussion
as to whether or not an "as is" disclaimer should be sufficient for the
implied warranty of habitability. 43 A strong argument can be made
that such a disclaimer should not be recognized against subsequent
purchasers. In Schepps v. Howe,"' however, the court recognized an
"as is" disclaimer in the context of certain other facts. In Schepps it
was not contested that the sale of the house had consistently been re-
ferred to as an "as is" sale. The "as is" disclaimer had been clear in
the listing, the advertising and the sale transaction itself.' 5 It also was
not disputed that this disclaimer had been brought to the attention of
the appellants and agreed to by them.
When one considers whether an "as is" disclaimer should be rec-
ognized as effective against the subsequent purchaser, one must be re-
minded that not all courts have recognized an "as is" disclaimer even
in the original transaction. In Davies v. Bradley,'" the Colorado court
was confronted with an "as is" disclaimer. The court stated that any
disclaimer of the warranty of habitability must contain an express pro-
vision to that effect and the limitation must be "clear and unambigu-
ous." 14 7 The court added that even where it can be shown that the
plaintiffs were aware of the presence of such a clause, if there was no
agreement as to its meaning it will not be binding.
In the subsequent purchaser situation it is quite possible that there
may not be either a clear understanding as to the meaning of the "as
is" disclaimer or even knowledge of its existence in the contract. As
mentioned earlier, it may not be perceived to be in the first purchaser/
seller's best interest to even point out the existence of such a dis-
claimer. Allowing such a term of art to be recognized in such a signifi-
142. Id. at 410-411.
143. See Larson, The "As Is" Disclaimer and the Sale of New Homes, 13 REAL EST. L.J.
238 (1985).
144. 665 P.2d 504 (Wyo. 1983).
145. Id. at 509.
146. 676 P.2d 1242 (Colo. 1983).
147. 676 P.2d at 1245.
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cant transaction may do a great injustice to an unwary purchaser.
JUDICIAL INNOVATION
The Illinois case of Redarowicz v. Ohlendorfl'8 might appear to
provide a workable model for handling the implied warranty of habita-
bility. The Redarowicz court stated that the warranty of habitability is
a creature of public policy and a product of judicial innovation. 14 9 Un-
like the case of Cosmopolitan Homes, Inc. v. Weller'50 wherein the
Colorado court stated that the implied warranty of habitability and fit-
ness arises from the contractual relation between the builder and the
purchaser,151 the court in Redarowicz stated only that the implied war-
ranty of habitability had its roots in the execution of the contract for
sale.152 The Illinois court emphasized that the cause of action exists
independently of the contract for sale and that consequently privity of
contract is not required.1 53
When a court identifies the implied warranty of habitability as a
distinct doctrine it can avoid a number of the problems that arise when
one attempts to characterize the cause of action as either tort or con-
tract. However, if that is what the court is doing, it should do so clearly
and expressly and make an attempt to define this new cause of action.
The dissent in Redarowicz made a similar observation. The dissent
stated that the majority in Redarowicz was actually turning the action
into a tort in the nature of strict liability.15 4
If this is to be regarded as a tort action, familiar problems must be
addressed. Earlier, the Illinois court in Moorman Manufacturing Co. v.
National Tank Co.' 55 had held that recovery for economic loss could
not be had under strict liability in tort. It is possible that even if this
were regarded as a tort action there could be an exception made for
recovering economic loss under the implied warranty of habitability.
But if that is what the court is doing, it is establishing precedent for
the position that it may be permissible to recover economic loss in other
tort actions. If the court is simply creating a new theory of recovery,
one needs to know more about its conceptual roots and its accrual date
148. 92 Ill. 2d 171, 441 N.E.2d 324 (1982).
149. Id. at 183, 441 N.E.2d at 330.
150. 663 P.2d 1041 (Colo. 1983).
151. 663 P.2d at 1045.
152. Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 92 Ill. 2d at 183, 441 N.E.2d at 330.
153. Id., 441 N.E.2d at 330.
154. Id. at 187, 441 N.E.2d at 332 (Ryan, C.J., dissenting).




Negligence and strict liability in tort might be available to a plain-
tiff as distinct theories of recovery. If the case arises in a jurisdiction
such as Arkansas, where the court has adopted the view of Justice
Francis set out in Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc.,156 the theory of
strict liability in tort will allow recovery for economic loss.15 7 In fact,
the Arkansas court in Blagg v. Fred Hunt Co., Inc.,1 58 as well as courts
in New Jersey,1 59 the District of Columbia, 60 and California, 61 have
accepted the claim that the theory of strict liability in tort is available
against vendors of defective homes. If one is going to accept strict lia-
bility in tort as a viable option, one should go one step further and
explain whether this action is the same as an implied warranty of hab-
itability action. One should consider whether it is desirable for the im-
plied warranty of habitability to evolve into a strict liability in tort ac-
tion. As long as the distinctions between these two theories of recovery
are not clear, difficulty will arise as to what is the appropriate statute
of limitations and what is necessary for a prima facie case.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, a number of changes can be made in order to make
the area of implied warranty of habitability more predictable and more
principled. First, courts can recognize the distinction between accrual
dates and limitation dates. Courts should make an effort to identify the
accrual date for the implied warranty of habitability and the subse-
quent period of limitation. The more logical choice for an accrual date
is the date on which the purchaser discovered or should have discovered
the defect. To select the completion date of the house as the appropri-
ate date is to create a situation where the statute begins to run at a
time when the plaintiff could not have initiated a lawsuit. 162
Second, courts should reach a consensus on the theoretical basis of
the implied warranty of habitability. Is it a contract action, is it a tort
action, or is it something else? As long as the implied warranty of hab-
itability is identified as a contract action, one will have to struggle with
privity problems. If the warranty is identified as a tort action, one will
156. 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
157. Blagg v. Fred Hunt Co., Inc., 272 Ark. 185, 190, 612 S.W.2d 321, 324 (1981).
158. Id.
159. Schipper v. Levitt and Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
160. Berman v. Watergate West, Inc., 391 A.2d 1351 (D.C. App. 1978).
161. Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969).
162. Stephens v. Creel, 429 So. 2d 278, 283 (Ala. 1983) (Jones, J., dissenting).
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struggle with economic loss questions. The implied warranty of habita-
bility should be recognized as a judicial innovation and perhaps be in-
terpreted as implied warranties are interpreted under the Uniform
Commercial Code. The requirement of privity should be dropped and
purchasers should be allowed to recover for mere deterioration or loss
of benefit in the purchase of the home.
Third, legislatures should be encouraged to enact statutes that are
more specific than improvement statutes and which expressly define the
terms and conditions of the implied warranty of habitability.'63 There
is an ongoing question as to the constitutionality of improvement stat-
utes. On their face, however, improvement statutes appear to be the
most appropriate source to determine the applicable statute of limita-
tions. As long as a question remains as to the constitutionality of im-
provement statutes, however, the plight of the subsequent purchaser
will be one of uncertainty.
Fourth, all jurisdictions should adopt the rule that subsequent pur-
chasers are entitled to receive the implied warranty of habitability.
Granted that this is premature as not every jurisdiction has recognized
the implied warranty of habitability for initial purchasers, the better
rule is to clearly acknowledge the right for the first purchaser and then
allow that purchaser to transfer it to a subsequent purchaser.
Fifth, courts should be reluctant to acknowledge disclaimers in the
situation of subsequent purchasers. If the disclaimers are recognized
they should be clear, unambiguous and specific. Courts should require
some proof that a disclaimer was explained and understood by the sub-
sequent purchasers. There should also be a requirement that the dis-
claimer be recorded as are other encumbrances. An effective disclaimer
can have a serious effect on the value of the property to a subsequent
purchaser.
Finally, an examination should be made as to whether or not strict
liability in tort is a preferred method for recovering for defects in
homes. An obvious problem is that if a jurisdiction does not recognize
economic loss damages in tort, strict liability would not be available.
However, if economic losses can be recovered through tort actions,
courts should begin to consider whether or not strict liability in tort
should be extended to sales of defective homes. One should also keep in
mind that if one is going to accept strict liability in tort as equivalent to
the implied warranty of habitability, one may have difficulty recogniz-
163. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 327A.01 et seq. (1977) (amended 1982).
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ing disclaimers of any sort.8 4 Courts should avoid the type of language
found in Donovan v. Pruit 65 where the court asserted that the implied
warranty does not arise out of documents. Rather, according to the
Donovan court, the warranty comes into existence by operation of law
by virtue of a common law duty of strict liability that the builder/
vendor owes to the first purchaser. 6 ' Language of this nature simply
confuses the distinction between a recovery in strict liability in tort and
a recovery under the implied warranty of habitability.
Perhaps the best route for courts to take is to recognize the im-
plied warranty of habitability as a distinct judicial innovation and fol-
low at least some of the rules that have been set out for implied war-
ranties in the sale of goods. Primarily, the courts should abolish the
privity requirement, as they did with the implied warranties in goods
situations, and allow subsequent purchasers to recover in spite of lack
of privity. Recognizing an obligation to proceed in a manner that builds
upon precedent and that is logically linked to well established theories,
such as contact and tort, courts have unfortunately led themselves into
an area where they contradict themselves and create significant dispari-
ties between different jurisdictions. This is an area where the legisla-
ture should assume responsibility. It should step in and draft a statute
of limitations for the implied warranty of habitability in order to re-
lieve the courts of their continuing struggles.
164. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment m (1965).
165. 36 Wash. App. 324, 674 P.2d 204 (1983).
166. Id. at 328, 674 P.2d at 207.
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